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Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences
In the proposed article, on the basis of an empirical study (34 in-depth interviews with key figures of government, business, experts), evolving models of interaction between the executive and legislative branches of power in two small Russian cities and one district of the Perm Territory are considered. The paper describes three models of interaction: “Bargaining or waiting”, “Hidden manipulation”, “Inside man in the right place”. It is shown that, despite the visible control of the analyzed political institutions, their relations cannot be described with just the help of the direct pressure model. In one case, it is possible to make the legislature manageable by the process of selecting candidates at the entrance, in the other – the model of bargaining or hidden manipulation turns out to be very effective. The overall assessment of the developing interaction between the two branches of power, which is confirmed by the research data, is still not sharply negative. The subjects of interaction do not show, on the one hand, either complete obedience, which can often be found in other regions, nor complete antagonism of each other, which also sometimes occurs. Readiness of one and the other sides to work on improving this interaction allows us to say that the working consensus between the territorial assembly and the executive local authority is essentially achievable. A part of the deputy corps initially considers its entering the representative power as a certain coalition agreement between them and the head, which is efficient all along of deputy activity. The conducted research allows assertion that coalitions between the executive and legislative power are created, as a rule, for the solution of tactical tasks and do not necessarily bring benefits to its members for a long period of time. The absence of strategic coalitions between the two branches of power leads to the fact that the field of urban policy is usually formed under the influence of momentary interests, and, despite all the inertia of the existing political institutions, it can be very turbulent.
town, coalition of key power actors, bargaining or temporising, hidden manipulation, own man in the right place, turbulence of town policy